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Abstract
Whether a country is able e￿ectively to address collective action problems is a critical
test of its ability to ful￿ll the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one par-
ticularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset
covering 25 years for some countries, we ￿nd that, overall, citizens of European countries
are more satis￿ed with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental
policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmen-
tal taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not as
pronounced. The evidence for the e￿ect of environmental quality on both satisfaction with
democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we ￿nd evidence that citizens
value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the presence of trucks as
unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high levels of
educational attainment tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents,
older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling.
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In this paper we study how the resolution of an important economic problem ￿ ensuring high
environmental quality ￿ plays a role in how citizens perceive the quality and performance of the
political system in which they live in. There is a lot of public discussion about the importance
of environmental issues, and it is evident that there is a greater popular awareness for environ-
mental problems today than some decades ago (Kirchg￿ssner & Schneider 2003; Tanguay et al.
2004). What is less known, however, is: Just how important is the environment to individuals’
perceptions of the performance of their governmental regimes, taking into account that indi-
viduals also want to achieve other, potentially con￿icting goals such as economic prosperity?
Answering this question is critical because most environmental policies are costly. Therefore,
their ultimate acceptance will hinge on the economic value the public assigns to such policies.
Even though most individuals recognize the collective bene￿ts of treating the environment
carefully, individual considerations are likely to undermine against such actions. In economic
terms, the environment is a classic case of a public good, for which a collective action problem
in the sense of Olson (1965) arises: The marginal collective bene￿ts of adopting careful actions,
vis-a-vis the environment, outweigh by far the marginal private bene￿ts (even though the latter
vary across individuals). Importantly, rational individuals are aware of this wedge between
what they know would be good for society, and what the optimal individual course of action is.
Thus, they know that environmental quality tends to be undersupplied. Consequently, the main
hypothesis that we test is that citizens want an e￿ective resolution of this dilemma. Because
solutions to collective action problems are available only through a broad consensus on policies,
the success a country has in tackling collective problems like the environment is a matter, among
other things, of how well a political system works. Therefore, we operationalize the research
question by asking more speci￿cally: Are citizens more satis￿ed with the way their political
system works when more environmental policies are established and/or environmental quality is
higher? And how much do they care about that issue, compared to other goals, such as personal
or country-wide economic welfare?
To answer these questions, we choose as the primary dependent variable a direct measure of
citizens’ views on the performance of their respective governments. This measure is ‘satisfac-
tion with democracy’ (SWD), a survey measure that is available for a wide range of countries.
Satisfaction with the way democracy works is not an indicator of system legitimacy per se.
Rather, it is one indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime widely used
in political science. Survey measures such as life satisfaction and happiness are very popular in
economic research (see, among many others, Frey & Stutzer 2000, 2002; Di Tella et al. 2003;
Alesina et al. 2004; Blanch￿ower & Oswald 2004; and Bjłrnskov et al. 2007). Because of
its comparable validity and usefulness (Linde & Ekman 2003), SWD and related measures are
also increasingly being applied (see, among others, Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004; and
Wagner et al. 2009). SWD does not attempt to capture whether people support the principles
of democracy, but rather how they judge it to work in practice in their actual experience. It is
a summary indicator (Clarke et al. 1993) that measures satisfaction with ‘the constitution in
operation’ (Klingemann 1999).1 As explanatory variables for SWD (besides standard individual
1Some work following Anderson & Guillory (1997) has considered political system determinants of SWD, but
2and country-level economic controls) we use a broad array of environmental policy and quality
variables. We compile a very large panel dataset, covering 16 countries in the time period from
1976 through 2000 (though we do not have data for every country-year combination).
We ￿nd that environmental policy and quality matter to citizens in statistically and eco-
nomically important ways. Over the whole sample period, more comprehensive environmental
policy is associated with more SWD. For example, an increase in the number of environmental
policy measures by one standard deviation is on average associated with a rise in SWD equiva-
lent to an increase in GDP growth by one standard deviation. Environmental expenditures also
are positively associated with SWD, while environmental taxes tend to have a negative e￿ect.
For instance, by increasing environmental expenditures (measured as a share of GDP) by one
percentage point, SWD for the average citizen is estimated to increase by about a quarter of a
standard deviation. Our ￿ndings are robust to controlling for unobserved time-invariant hetero-
geneity and numerous time-varying controls at both the country level and the individual level.
We also present evidence, using three distinct sample splits, that some citizens (such as parents,
young citizens, and those who are highly educated) tend to care more about environmental issues
than others. In sum, the results suggest that citizens, or at least important subsets of them, ex-
pect the political system to implement policies that address the environmental collective action
problem.
With these ￿ndings, the paper relates to the literature on political economy, governance, and
happiness. Some evidence now exists that good government (measured by broad concepts such
as e￿ectiveness, observance of the rule of law, absence of corruption, responsiveness to citizens’
preferences, accountability, and political stability) is associated with greater happiness, or in-
dividual life satisfaction (Helliwell & Huang 2008). Helliwell (2006) and Layard (2006) provide
summaries of related results on the relationship between public policies and happiness. How-
ever, we do not know of any study that has considered the government’s success in implementing
policies addressing speci￿c collective action problems. Perhaps closest to our study are some
economics papers that have studied environmental quality (but not policy) as a determinant of
happiness. One line of work has considered speci￿c environmental amenities. For example, Van
Praag & Baarsma (2005) use the happiness approach to value airport noise. A second line of
work studies broader environmental measures. Welsch (2006) presents evidence that air pollu-
tion, such as ambient nitrogen, particulates and lead, is negatively associated with subjective
well-being for ten European countries (see also Welsch 2002). Welsch (2007) expands the anal-
ysis to a cross-section of 54 countries and calculates the marginal rate of substitution of income
for pollution abatement. Rehdanz & Maddison (2005) examine the relationship between climate
and happiness in an empirical analysis using data on 67 countries. They ￿nd that happiness
increases with a higher mean temperature in the coldest month and decreases with higher mean
temperatures in the hottest month as well as that it decreases with a more months with very
little precipitation of rain.2
so far no study has considered the implications of speci￿c policy measures.
2As such, the present paper and the cited studies can also be interpreted as complementary to the existing, rich
literature in economics that has addressed the economic value of speci￿c environmental amenities. See Freeman
(1985) and Environmental Protection Agency (2000) for surveys. Standard methods include, on the one hand,
revealed preference methods and hedonic pricing (Viscusi 1993; Bockstael et al. 1987; Rosen 1974), including
those based on recreation demand estimation (Bockstael & McConnell 1983; Morey et al. 1993), as well as,
3All of these studies use either purely cross-sectional data, or, where they use panel data, they
average happiness over all individuals in a country. However, this assumes homogenous policy
e￿ects, reduces the degrees of freedom substantially, and requires cardinality of the satisfaction
scores, making it a less than ideal method for the question under study. One prior study that uses
individual-level data is by Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Gowdy (2007). However, their investigation of
the relationship between individual happiness and attitudes towards ozone pollution and species
extinction is limited to British data.
Our ￿ndings on environmental quality are broadly consistent with these studies. However,
our results add to the existing literature in four important ways. First, this is the ￿rst study, to
the best of our knowledge, to consider SWD as a measure of how much individuals care about
the environment. Because environmental problems are by their nature collective problems, un-
derstanding variations in perceptions of the quality of the constitution in operation provides
insights beyond those available from studying individual well-being. (We show in the robustness
section that environmental policy and quality also matter for happiness.) Second, no study has
evaluated the relationship between environmental policy measures and any satisfaction variable.
Policies and quality may be related, but there may be important time lags, and citizens’ evalua-
tions of the e￿ectiveness of the political system should take into account whether or not the right
policies are in place. Third, we use what is, to our knowledge, the largest panel dataset of SWD
to date. Fourth, we test for e￿ects that are heterogenous across sub-groups of the population
which is something papers using country-level averages cannot do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section2 presents the hypotheses, describes the
data, and discusses how our method di￿ers from, and in our judgment improves on, approaches
employed in related studies. Section3 presents the ￿ndings. Section4 concludes this paper.
2 Hypotheses, data and methodology
We begin by deriving our hypotheses. We then discuss our dependent variable(s), after which
we present our key explanatory variables and our controls. Finally, we describe our estimation
strategy.
2.1 Hypotheses
We test three simple ideas. First, economic theory suggests that collective action problems are
never fully resolved. In particular, public goods such as environmental quality will generally be
undersupplied, i.e., the collective marginal bene￿ts will be greater than the collective marginal
costs even when private marginal bene￿ts and costs are already equated (Olson 1965). This
results in free-riding and a tendency for environmental degradation (that is, the production
of a public bad), among what Olson (1965) termed as latent groups. Most countries fall into
this category.3 Citizens recognize these collective action problems. This implies that individuals
on the other hand, stated preference (contingent valuation) methods (Mitchell & Carson 1989;, Portney 1993;
Hanemann 1994; Diamond & Hausman 1994).
3In Olson’s (1965) analysis, group size plays an important role, but virtually all countries are so big that
individual bene￿ts from environmental quality, net of the costs of contributing to this public good, are most
likely to be negative throughout.
4would prefer better environmental quality than is usually provided. While Olson (1965) proposed
some speci￿c mechanisms for how participation can be induced in an otherwise latent group (such
as through selective incentives, through repeated interaction, and as by-products of the actions
of groups actually created for other purposes), we generally hypothesize that political systems
that are more successful at resolving such problems of collective action will command more
respect from their citizens. For this result to hold, we need only to assume that individuals
regard environmental quality as a good thing. Speci￿cally, our ￿rst hypothesis is that higher
environmental quality leads to greater satisfaction with the way democracy works.
Citizens may also expect, more concretely, from the ‘constitution in operation’ that it allows
the government to provide (at least partially) e￿ective ways towards a resolution of the collective
action problem. That is, because citizens recognize that their country is not a unitary actor and
may, thus, face a collective action problem, they may perceive it as desirable to have external
solutions or at least the setting of boundary conditions for individual actions imposed by the
government. Some frictions in the political system are needed to generate an empirical relation-
ship between policy and SWD. To see this, suppose that voters have single-peaked preferences
over environmental policy and that environmental policy is determined by politicians to cater to
the preferences of citizens (Downs 1957). In principle, in a perfectly functioning political system,
under majority voting, the median voter will thus ‘set’ environmental policy (Black 1948). There
would then exist no relation between policy and SWD (if one assumes that the SWD survey
sample is representative enough to bracket the median voter): Each country, at each point in
time, is e￿ecting the policy regarded as optimal by the median voter. However, imperfections of
the political system may lead to deviations from that optimum. First, elected candidates do not
necessarily deliver on their campaign promises. Second, policies are not set continuously, and
lobbying activities may lead to both over-provision (if environmental lobbyists are more pow-
erful) or under-provision (if companies favoring laxer environmental standards carry the day);
see Grossman & Helpman (2001). While we do not develop a formal theoretical model in this
paper, it seems plausible that on balance the political system would lead to an under-provision of
policies that generate positive externalities, compared to what a full resolution of the collective
action problem would require. Thus, we also test the idea that environmental policy is generally
seen as an important aspect of a well-functioning democracy and will, therefore, also lead to
more SWD.
In summation, our two core hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: More environmental policy is associated with higher SWD.
Hypothesis 2: Better environmental quality is associated with higher SWD.
Third, citizens’ preferences over environmental issues may di￿er not only across countries
but also within countries. Many environmental problems inherently are long-term challenges.
A purely sel￿sh individual might simply not care about what happens after he or she dies.
Even rational economic models frequently assume, however, that individuals have a bequest
motive, as they think about the welfare of their o￿spring. Issues of sustainable development and
preserving the environment for future generations may, therefore, di￿erentially a￿ect individuals’
perceptions of the way democracy works. If individuals expect environmental problems mainly
5to concern themselves only in the long run (or even to a￿ect only future generations, not their
own) this would suggest that (i) younger citizens and (ii) those with children should care more
about environmental policy.
Hypothesis 3a: Younger citizens’ SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy
and quality than the SWD of their older counterparts.
Hypothesis 3b: Parents’ SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy and
quality than the SWD of non-parents.
Finally, one might argue that the awareness of such complex, long-term problems as the
environment, and the awareness of what politics does to address them, might increase with
educational attainment. Thus, one could expect a stronger reaction among citizens with more
years of formal schooling.
Hypothesis 3c: More highly educated citizens’ SWD reacts more strongly to envi-
ronmental policy and quality than SWD of their lower educated counterparts.
2.2 Data
All our data, including the hand-collected items, will be available to other researchers upon
publication of this study. Detailed information on all data used can be found in the Data
appendix.
2.2.1 Dependent variable
The primary dependent variable for our empirical analysis is a 4-point scale measure of SWD on
an individual level from the Eurobarometer survey, based on the question ‘On the whole, are you
very satis￿ed, fairly satis￿ed, not very satis￿ed or not at all satis￿ed with the way democracy
works in our country? ’. The Eurobarometer is a biannual survey launched in 1970 (turning into
a quarterly survey in 2000) and includes questions about opinions and basic attitudes regarding
the EU and its institutions, politics, economy and society. The question on SWD was ￿rst asked
in a core of nine countries in 1973, continued to be asked of respondents from these countries
in 1976, and was expanded after 1980, in a stepwise manner, to include respondents from an
additional seven countries. We obtain these data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend
File, 1970-2002. This an integrated set of data covering harmonized variables for the years
1970 through 2002 that allow a cross-time (and cross-country) comparison. The question on
SWD was not asked in every survey round in each country since 1973. However, as Table 1
shows, we have information from 313 country-years (covering responses from more than 570;000
participants).4
As Figure 1 shows, there is substantial variation across countries in terms of the average
level of SWD. Luxembourg exhibits the highest SWD in the whole EU, with a mean of 2:90.
4In our regression analysis below, we have to exclude all observations from the nine country-years from 1973
since no (comparable) information on labor market status is available. We further lose some observations due to
missing information on several individual-level control variables.
6Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria (all values above 2:69) also do very well in
terms of satisfying their citizens’ expectations of democracy. Ireland, Sweden and Germany are
all slightly above the EU average of 2:58 (calculated by averaging country-averages). The larger
economies, such as the United Kingdom, France and Spain have values below the average. The
country with the lowest levels of satisfaction is Italy, with an average of 1:96.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
SWD is a survey measure and, as such, it is, in principle, subject to the same criticisms
as any survey. Our line of reasoning in using this dependent variable is pragmatic: SWD has
been validated and applied widely (Anderson & Guillory 1997; Linde & Ekman 2003), and we
take its usefulness as a starting point.5 Note also that, in contrast to contingent valuation
approaches, the subjects we study answered the questions about their SWD independently of a
speci￿c policy context. Thus, our approach does not require that the respondents be aware of
any cause-and-e￿ect relationship. It is not even necessary that respondents know the level of
environmental quality. Therefore, our approach is cognitively less demanding than contingent
valuation, and whatever relationship we ￿nd cannot be caused by strategic answers.
As an alternative dependent variable, we use overall well-being. This will allow us to contrast
our ￿ndings for SWD with the related ￿ndings in this domain. The Eurobarometer includes a
question on life satisfaction: ‘On the whole, are you very satis￿ed, fairly satis￿ed, not very
satis￿ed or not at all satis￿ed with the life you lead? , and another one on happiness ‘Taking all
things together, how would you say things are these days ￿ would you say you’re very happy,
fairly happy, or not too happy these days? ’. Since the number of available observations is
substantially larger in the case of the former question (648;083 versus 134;607), we use this
4-point scale variable to capture overall well-being, and refer to this variable as life satisfaction
(LS) below. Figure 1 indicates that SWD and LS are related, but by no means equivalent. The
correlation between the two variables on the individual level is 0:331. On the aggregate level,
we see that SWD is typically somewhat lower and more volatile than LS.
2.2.2 Environmental policy
We collect information from di￿erent sources in order to capture di￿erent aspects of environmen-
tal policy with di￿erent measures: (i) the existence of a wide array of certain policy measures,
(ii) revenues from environmental taxes as a percentage of GDP, (iii) public expenditure on the
environment as a percentage of GDP, and (iv) the share of votes for green parties.
Information on the existence of certain policy measures intended to protect the environment
are collected from Binder (2002). These policy measures essentially cover the full spectrum of
environmental regulation: from subsidies for renewable energy to environmental ministries, from
environmental labels to the existence of a nature conservancy act. 6 For each policy action, a
5See Canache et al. (2001) for a critique of SWD and Anderson (2005) for a response to that critique.
6We read this information from the tables and graphs in Binder (2002). The full list of the 16 available policy
measures is as follows: quota for electricity from renewable energy sources, energy/CO 2 tax, packaging rules,
sustainability council, subsidy for electricity from renewable energy sources, energy e￿ciency labels, environmen-
tal plan, ecolabels, environmental o￿ce, environmental expert council, general environmental act, environmental
7binary variable is de￿ned that is set equal to one if a country had taken that action in a given
year. For example, the variable energy/CO2 tax is equal to one when a country had an energy
tax in place in a given year and zero otherwise. We then calculate a summary measure, which
is simply the number of all policy acts implemented in a given year. It encapsulates the degree
to which a country has established a comprehensive set of environmental policies. It is apparent
from Figure 2 that there is a tremendous variation in the adoption of such policies across the
sample countries. The Netherlands started early and had implemented all 16 policy measures
by 1999. In contrast, Belgium was a late adopter and still lags far behind at the end of the
sample period.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The data on revenues from environmental taxes and government expenditure on environment
protection (both measured as a percentage of GDP) are from the database of Eurostat. The
evolution of the adoption of these policy measures in each country also is depicted in Figure 2.
Unfortunately, these variables are not available for the whole sample period. Information on
taxes is missing completely before 1980, and in the case of expenditures, even before 1990.
Notably, the level of government expenditure on environment protection is lower throughout than
the revenues from environmental taxes. The revenues from environmental taxes, as a percentage
of GDP, are in a range from 1:54% (Spain 1989) to 5:39% (Denmark 1999). Expenditures range
between 0:2% (Sweden, 1995 1999) and 1:5% (Luxembourg, 1992 1994). Of course, the ability
of tax revenues (alone) to capture the degree of environmental friendliness may be limited. For
instance, low revenues can either be due to little use of environmental taxes, or due to a broad and
e￿ective use of such taxes, where high tax rates have altered citizens’ behavior. However, when
we employ this variable below, we control for other environmental policy measures, allowing us
to draw ceteris paribus conclusions.
Finally, we have data on the percentage of total cabinet posts held by green parties (weighted
by days) from the Comparative Political Data Set I. This variable serves as a control variable,
and we have per se no clear hypothesis on its ceteris paribus e￿ect on SWD. We think of this
variable as a good proxy for the degree of environmental awareness, and we will use it as a
covariate to check the robustness of our results.
As Table 2 shows, environmental policy and environmental expenditures are (perhaps sur-
prisingly) essentially uncorrelated. Environmental taxes are positively correlated with both the
summary policy measure and environmental expenditures. As expected, we see that the larger is
the share of green parties in the cabinet, the greater is the number of implemented environmental
policy measures and the higher the environmental expenditures.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
reporting rules, waste disposal act, environmental protection as a constitutional goal, nature conservancy act,
and a soil protection act.
82.2.3 Environmental quality
To measure environmental quality we use data on (i) emissions 7 and on (ii) road networks and
tra￿c. In particular, we use data from the OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2004
on emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile
organic compounds (VOC) and carbon dioxide (CO2). The main human sources of SOx are
from burning fossil fuels, smelting and paper manufacture. SOx emissions cause adverse e￿ects
on respiratory systems of humans and animals, and damage to vegetation. In particular, they
contribute to acid rain and thus have negative e￿ects on aquatic ecosystems. NOx emissions ￿
mainly due to the burning of fossil fuels at high temperatures ￿ play an important role in the
production of photochemical oxidants and of smog, and contribute, together with SOx, to acid
precipitation. CO interferes with the absorption of oxygen by red blood cells and causes adverse
health e￿ects. Emissions of VOC are considered, along with NOx, to be the main precursors of
photochemical air pollution. Finally, man-made CO2 emissions result mainly from the burning
of fossil fuels. The World Health Organization reports that the atmospheric concentration of
CO2 has increased by more than 30% since pre-industrial times. This disturbs the balance of the
earth’s radiative energy budget. It is associated with a rise in the earth’s surface temperature
and is related to e￿ects on climate change, sea levels and global agricultural production. CO 2
contributes the largest share to global warming (OECD 2004).
Table 3 (see columns 1 to 5) and Figure 3 summarize the variation in emissions across coun-
tries and over time. We can see that the variation across countries (and also across categories
within countries) is in fact more pronounced than the variation over time. Interestingly, many
countries perform quite well in one category, but emit well above average in other categories.
For instance, Norway has below average per capita emissions of SOx and CO2. It is, however,
by far the biggest per capita emitter of VOC. Its 76:19 tons per 1;000 population is more than
twice that of the sample average. Greece is the biggest per capita emitter of SOx, but in all
other categories it is below average. Luxembourg (almost an outlier) is a huge per capita emitter
of CO, CO2, NOx, and VOC. Sweden, on the other hand, performs quite well in all categories.
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here]
Arguably, tra￿c, and in particular roadway congestion, plays a major role in day-to-day
perceptions of environmental quality. To capture the quality and the extent of the road network
in relation to the stock of passenger cars and all other motor vehicles (basically trucks) we
construct three variables based on information collected from the OECD Environmental Data
Compendium 2004. We use (i) the number of passenger cars per kilometer of the total road
network and (ii) the number of trucks per kilometer of the total road network. Moreover, (iii),
since the road network can be divided into ‘normal’ roads and highway miles, we calculate
highways miles as a share of the distance spanned by a country’s total road network and include
this variable as a control for the structure of the road network. Columns 6 to 8 of Table 3 and
7Ideally, one would like to use the actually relevant impact for individuals. To the extent that we ￿nd emissions
to be negatively associated with SWD, this e￿ect, therefore, also captures the positive non-use value of lower
emissions. Even that, however, ignores the possibility that for individuals living at the border of another country,
that other country’s policies and outcomes may be more relevant than the home country’s policies.
9Figure 4 provide descriptive statistics for these three variables. There is substantial variation
across countries for all three measures. Moreover, in general, we observe a (rather modest)
upward trend in congestion and in the share of highways.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
2.3 Control variables
2.3.1 Country-level
To control for various determinants of SWD other than environmental factors, we employ a set
of (economic) control variables. Better economic performance is most likely associated with
higher SWD. As proxies for the overall economic performance we use real GDP per capita, the
real GDP growth rate, the in￿ation rate (the annual rate of change in the prices of consumption
goods), and the annual budget de￿cit. Moreover, we include openness (exports plus imports
divided by real GDP), the total receipts of the government as a percentage of GDP, population
size, and an index of the degree of electoral fractionalization of the party-system. 8
2.3.2 Individual-level covariates
It is common in studies of SWD to also include demographic variables. We include a set of socio-
economic control variables capturing: age, sex, family status, education, and labor market status.
Clearly, we would have preferred to control for income, also on the individual level. However,
this information is not available for several years and several countries. In any case, education
(captured by school leaving age) and labor market status (where we compare employed citizens
to unemployed, self-employed, and those out of the labor force) arguably are good proxies for
income.
2.4 Empirical strategy
Our empirical approach is simple. We run regressions with individual SWD as the dependent
variable and our key environmental variables as well as control variables (on an individual and
a country level). Speci￿cally, due to the nature of the dataset we are able to employ a panel
regression, and include country and year ￿xed e￿ects. Since our dependent variable SWD is
measured on a four-point scale, we estimate an ordered logit model.
Two aspects of this empirical approach merit comments. First, note that to explore the e￿ect
of environmental policy and environmental quality on SWD, we have to deal with data measured
on two di￿erent levels. While we observe SWD on an individual level, we measure environmental
policy and environmental quality on a country-level.9 Moulton (1990) drew economists’ atten-




i , where vi is the
share of votes for party i and n the number of parties. That means, a larger value of this Rae-Index indicates
a more fractionalized system. Note that, because all our countries are democracies, controlling for the extent
of democracy is not likely to yield added insights. We also included the institutional quality indices found by
Wagner et al. (2009) to be correlated with SWD. Whilst this substantially reduces the number of observations,
the overall results remain similar and are available on request.
9In fact, we would prefer individual-level data for environmental policy and environmental quality, but these
data do not exist, at least not in a dataset that measures individuals’ SWD.
10tion to the fact that applying standard estimation methods in this setup can lead to standard
errors that are biased downward. Early work tried to meet this challenge by using averaged
data. But this ignores heterogeneity on the individual level and assumes homogenous policy
e￿ects. Moreover, it reduces the degrees of freedom substantially and requires cardinality of the
satisfaction scores. We instead wish to make full use of the information collected at the indi-
vidual level. Therefore, we follow standard practice and calculate Huber (1967)-White (1980)
standard errors robust to clustering on the country-year level (Froot 1989; Williams 2000).10
The second issue we highlight is that of causality. If we observe a statistically signi￿cant
coe￿cient on environmental policy in a regression explaining SWD, this does not necessarily
mean that environmental policy causes higher SWD. To make a clean causal statement, we
would need truly exogenous variation, i.e., random assignment of environmental policies across
countries. In fact, however, policy is also endogenous. There are two broad classes of endogeneity
concerns: reverse causation and omitted variables. It appears somewhat unlikely that there is
reverse causation from SWD to environmental policy. But we cannot completely exclude the
possibility that some other omitted (and perhaps unobservable) factors are correlated with both
SWD and environmental policy. While this is a concern that is not to be taken lightly, we note
that by including many (time-varying) control variables, we ameliorate this concern to a large
extent. The longitudinal component of the dataset is also particulary useful in another way:
Since we include ￿xed e￿ects on a country level we control also for all unobserved time-invariant
factors. Overall, this control strategy facilitates, though does not completely guarantee, a causal
interpretation of our results.11
3 Estimation results
Our primary results for environmental policy are presented in Table 4, and those for environ-
mental quality are presented in Table 5. In order to provide interpretable estimation output,
we report ￿ besides the coe￿cients (k) and the standard errors ￿ standardized coe￿cients and
changes in the predicted probabilities. Coe￿cients rescaled by their standard deviation (hence-
forth denoted by ) enable a simple interpretation just like coe￿cients from a linear regression
model. For non-binary explanatory variables we report the fully standardized coe￿cients, given
by Sf
k = kk=SWD, which can be interpreted as the standard deviation increase in SWD
associated with a one standard deviation increase in each of the respective explanatory variable,
holding all other variables constant. In the case of binary explanatory variables we report the
standardized coe￿cients, given by S
k = k=SWD, which measures the estimated ceteris paribus
standard deviation increase in SWD when the binary explanatory variable switches from zero
to one. For the variables of primary interest we report in addition the predicted probabilities of
10Country-level regressions, where we use average SWD as the dependent variable and regress it on our envi-
ronmental policy measures, all country-level control variables used in the paper, as well as country and year ￿xed
e￿ects, yield results that are similar overall to those produced by individual-level regressions.
11In a predecessor working paper, we employed an alternative empirical strategy, namely a hierarchical (multi-
level) model. The original paper, which used only a cross-sectional dataset, is available upon request. Unfortu-
nately, a hybrid of the two approaches (￿xed e￿ects and hierarchical modeling) is still an underdeveloped area of
econometric research (Kim & Frees 2006). While, broadly speaking, the results in the original paper were similar
to the present one, the richer data and the empirical strategy employed here ￿ in particular the ability to control
for country ￿xed e￿ects ￿ imply that the present results should be seen as more reliable.
11being ‘not at all satis￿ed’ (m = 1), ‘not very satis￿ed’ (m = 2), ‘fairly satis￿ed’ (m = 3) and
‘very satis￿ed’ (m = 4) due to a discrete change in the respective covariate by half of a standard
deviation holding all other covariates at their mean ( x), that is, Pr(SWD = mj x)=xk.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
3.1 Individual and country-level characteristics
We begin by commenting brie￿y on our control variables. Regarding the individual-level char-
acteristics, it is worth noting that we ￿nd very robust e￿ects. That is, the qualitative and
quantitative results concerning the demographic covariates are rather similar across all speci￿-
cations. Substantively, we ￿nd that females have a signi￿cantly lower level of SWD. Holding
all other covariates constant, speci￿cation (I) in Table 4 suggests that their SWD is 0:013 stan-
dard deviations less than that of male respondents.12 With respect to age we ￿nd an inverted
U-shaped relationship. Young citizens (i.e., between 15 and 24 years of age, the base group)
have a comparably high SWD. Thereafter, we observe a decrease in SWD with rising age. This
downward trend, however, reverses for citizens in the more senior age group (i.e., 65 years of age
and older). To some extent, this suggests that SWD decreases over the period of working life
(when citizens contribute most in terms of taxes). Married citizens are on average more satis￿ed
(plus 0:053 standard deviations). The coe￿cients of the variables capturing individual economic
status by and and large are mainly statistically signi￿cant. As expected, unemployed citizens are
￿ compared to employed citizens ￿ less satis￿ed (minus 0:280 standard deviations). Somewhat
surprisingly, self-employed individuals are also comparably less satis￿ed with the way democ-
racy works (minus 0:022 standard deviations). It is, for instance, possible that entrepreneurial
citizens would on average value more opportunities for political involvement, or entrepreneurial
activity per se typically reveals certain shortcomings of the political system. Citizens out of the
labor force (i.e., the retired or housewives) do not exhibit a statistically signi￿cant di￿erent level
of SWD compared to employed citizens. Finally, satisfaction rises with education. Compared to
the base group of citizens with low educational attainment (i.e., below 16 years of formal educa-
tion), the SWD of citizens with medium and high levels of educational attainment is greater by
0:034 and 0:086 standard deviations, respectively. The peak level of SWD, however, is achieved
by currently enrolled citizens; their SWD is even 0:128 standard deviations larger.
The results for the country-level characteristics are also instructive (see, for instance spec-
i￿cation (II) in Table 4). Richer, faster-growing, smaller economies and those that run larger
de￿cits but have lower government revenue to GDP ratios have higher SWD. Openness and
SWD are negatively correlated. In￿ation enters positively, which may have to do with the fact
that in the period under consideration, in￿ation in these countries was relatively moderate and
arguably related to economic growth.
12It is outside the scope of this paper to determine whether or not this may be explained by discrimination
against women in various aspects of live, such as the labor market, but this would appear to be an important
question for further research.
123.2 Environmental policy
The primary ￿nding of interest in Table 4 is the impact of our summary measure of environmental
policy on SWD. The strong and robust result that emerges is that, controlling for a large variety
of individual and country-level explanatory variables, a more developed environmental policy is
applauded by citizens. The summary measure enters as a statistically signi￿cant determinant of
SWD. Speci￿cation (II) suggest that an increase in the number of implemented policy measures
by one standard deviation (which is equal to 3:78 policies) increases SWD by 0:09 standard
deviations (which is equal to 0:075 points). Equivalently, the probability that a citizen is ‘fairly
satis￿ed’ (‘very satis￿ed’) with the way democracy works is 2:9 (1:3) percentage points higher
if the number of implemented policy measures increases by half of a standard deviation. This
quantitative e￿ect is comparable to that of real GDP growth. The average marginal e￿ect (not
tabulated) of these two variables is about the same: An additional environmental policy measure
implemented, or an increase in GDP growth by one percentage point both increase SWD by
0:006 points. Compared to the gender-gap in SWD, an additional environmental policy measure
creates an average e￿ect seven times larger than the male-female di￿erence in SWD.
Notably, the results on the e￿ect of our summary measure of environmental policy on SWD
remain unchanged when controlling for the share of green parties in the cabinet, as in spec-
i￿cation (III) of Table 4. This is important because the green parties’ percentages of total
cabinet posts can be interpreted as time-varying proxies for the degree of environmental aware-
ness. Speci￿cation (IV) ￿nally introduces ￿scal activities of the government with respect to
environmental policies; note here that the sample size is reduced considerably. Still, even when
we control for environmental taxes and expenditures in this smaller sample, the e￿ect of the
summary measure of environmental policy is present and signi￿cant (p-value of 0:09). We also
tested whether the e￿ect of the summary measure changes over time (i.e., we introduced in-
teraction terms between year ￿xed e￿ects and the summary measure). While we ￿nd that the
e￿ect is signi￿cantly di￿erent in various years, no clear long-run trend is visible. These results
are available upon request.13
In line with the estimated positive e￿ect of our summary measure of environmental policy
on SWD, we ￿nd that citizens’ SWD increases with public expenditures on the environment.
An increase in expenditures by one standard deviation (0:272 percentage points of GDP) is
associated with a 0:062 standard deviation increase in SWD. The estimated average marginal
e￿ect (i.e., the e￿ect of an increase in expenditures by one percentage point of GDP) is equal to
0:055 points. With respect to environmental taxes we ￿nd a negative e￿ect on SWD. One could
have expected that environmental taxes might have a positive e￿ect on SWD due to the potential
double dividend they o￿er in the form of a reduction of negative externalities and a reduction of
other distortionary taxes. However, our results do not support this prediction. Instead, citizens
seem to ￿nd only government intervention through enhanced spending appropriate, but SWD
13In untabulated regressions, we have considered ‘kitchen-sink’ models including binary variables for all of
the individual policy measures. Only a few individual policy measures are consistently positively or negatively
related with SWD; instead, the sign (and signi￿cance) often depends on the introduction of additional controls.
The statistical signi￿cance of individual measures may also arise as an artefact of the correlations between the
many policy variables included in the horserace. While the summary measure is, by de￿nition, a cruder proxy
for environmental policy, the results obtained with it are more stable.
13is ceteris paribus lower when environmental taxes are higher. Our estimation suggests that an
increase in environmental taxes by one standard deviation decreases SWD by 0:073 standard
deviations. The average marginal e￿ect is 0:025 points. The positive e￿ects of the summary
measure and the public environmental spending, in combination with the negative e￿ect of taxes,
are consistent with an economic understanding of environmental problems as collective action
problems, i.e., the notion that most individuals care about the environment but few are willing
to bear the costs of protecting it. Overall, we interpret our ￿ndings as substantial support for
Hypothesis 1 that the adoption of more policy measures increases SWD.
3.3 Environmental quality
The second hypothesis that we test is that environmental quality should be positively associated
with SWD. Table5 shows the results for this hypothesis, ￿rst introducing various categories of
emissions, then introducing three measures of tra￿c and congestion, and then including all
measures (along with the share of green parties in the cabinet). A number of interesting ￿ndings
emerge from studying these sets of variables both individually and jointly.
Across all speci￿cations we ￿nd negative coe￿cients for sulphur oxide (SOx), nitrogen oxide
(NOx), and carbon monoxide emissions (CO). However, only the estimated e￿ects of nitrogen
oxides are statistically signi￿cant throughout. An increase in emissions of nitrogen oxides by
one standard deviation decreases SWD by about 0:1 to 0:15 standard deviations. The estimated
positive e￿ect of emissions of volatile organic compounds (V OC) and carbon dioxide (CO2)
are puzzling. It seems that these categories of emissions are correlated in speci￿cation (I)
with unobserved time-varying SWD-enhancing mobility factors. After controlling for tra￿c and
congestion in speci￿cations (III) and (IV), the statistical signi￿cance of carbon dioxide vanishes.
With respect to our measures of tra￿c and congestions we ￿nd a positive e￿ect for the car-
road ratio, and a robust negative e￿ect for the truck-road ratio. It seems that citizens value
their personal mobility (in terms of having a car) quite highly, and even accept a large car-road
ratio (i.e., a higher likelihood of congestion). By contrast, they perceive heavy truck tra￿c to
be unpleasant and they favor governmental regulations to reduce it. Especially the latter result
is plausible, given the signi￿cant amount of public discussion of this topic in some countries.
(See, for example, the transit tra￿c con￿ict between the Austrian government and the EU).
In summary, the results on environmental quality are not as strong as those on environmental
policy and provide only weak evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. Citizens may be less informed
about environmental quality (captured, for example, by emissions) and/or may hold the domestic
political system less responsible for environmental protection within this domain, since they
perceive it as a more global phenomenon where national action is less e￿ective.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
3.4 Life satisfaction
Our equivalent analysis of the e￿ect of environmental policy on LS is summarized in the upper
panel of Table6, while the results for environmental quality are summarized in the lower panel.
14For environmental quality, we obtain, overall, the same patterns as for SWD. As for policy, we can
see that the summary measure of environmental policy also has a statistically signi￿cant positive
e￿ect on LS. However, this e￿ect is somewhat smaller and less robust than found previously.
In speci￿cations (I) through (III) the estimated e￿ect is highly statistically signi￿cant, and
suggests that an increase of the summary measure by one standard deviation increases LS by
up to 0:079 standard deviations. In speci￿cation (IV), where we include environmental taxes
and expenditures as additional covariates, however, statistical signi￿cance vanishes and the
estimated e￿ect is basically zero. Likewise, we ￿nd a smaller (and less signi￿cant) e￿ect of public
environmental expenditures on LS. The average marginal e￿ect is about 0:025. Environmental
taxes turn out not to be a signi￿cant determinant of LS. Overall, we interpret these results as
evidence that SWD and LS are related but distinct concepts. In our context we ￿nd a stronger
relationship between SWD and (environmental) policy measures. This ￿nding seems plausible
since SWD refers to the current political situation, while LS is an all-encompassing evaluation
of individuals’ current life conditions.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
3.5 Heterogenous e￿ects
To operationalize causal heterogeneity with respect to the impact of environmental measures on
SWD, and to test Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, we split the sample along the dimensions of age,
parenthood, and educational attainment.
With respect to age, we distinguish between young (below 34 years of age) and old (at
least 55 years of age) citizens. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer does not include a speci￿c
question on parenthood. However, respondents are asked (in 90 usable country-years) ‘How
many children under 15 are there living at home? ’.14 Given that, in almost all cases, mothers
obtain (physical) custody after divorce (or separation) this question can be used to construct
valid information on parenthood for women. Therefore, when we refer to parents we distinguish
between female parents and female non-parents. To explore the e￿ect among poorly and highly
educated citizens we compare estimations based on a sample of citizens with 15 years of formal
education or less, and citizens with at least 16 years of formal education.15 Since we cannot
control for income in our full sample, educational attainment incorporates not only the e￿ect of
education but (potentially) also the e￿ect of income.
Table7 provides the results. Consider ￿rst the upper panel, where the ￿rst two columns show
the e￿ects of environmental measures on SWD for young and old citizens. A comparison of the
standardized estimates (and their signi￿cance) indicates that younger citizens care comparably
more about environmental policy. For instance, an increase in the summary measure by one
standard deviation, increases the SWD of young citizens by 0:070 standard deviations, and those
of older citizens by only 0:056 standard deviations. The next two columns di￿erentiate between
14To be precise, in a subset of waves the survey di￿erentiates further between younger (below 8 years of age)
and older (above 8 and below 15 years of age) children.
15The data allow us to consistently distinguish between citizens who are still studying ( 8:9%), those who have
up to 15 years (29:04%), between 16 and 19 years (37:68%) and 20 or more years (24:37%) of formal education.
15parents and non-parents. While the estimated e￿ect of our summary measure of environmental
policy is not statistically signi￿cant (at conventional levels) in either sample, it is remarkable
that the estimated coe￿cient is three times larger for parents and has a smaller standard error.
With respect to environmental expenditures we ￿nd that in the case of parents each standard
deviation increase in these expenditures increases SWD by 0:105 standard deviations. This e￿ect
is highly statistically signi￿cant. The equivalent e￿ect for non-parents is only 0:066 standard
deviations. Comparing poorly and highly educated citizens, we ￿nd a comparatively stronger
e￿ect of the summary measure in the latter sample (0:092 versus 0:029).16 We ￿nd similar
patterns in an equivalent analysis of LS (not shown).
Overall, we interpret these ￿ndings on heterogenous e￿ects as broadly, though not extremely
strongly, supportive for Hypotheses 3a through 3c as far as environmental policy is concerned.
By contrast, our analysis of heterogenous e￿ects of environmental quality on SWD (and LS)
does not yield important di￿erences between the sub-groups of citizens under consideration.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates satisfaction with democracy in the presence of an especially important
and topical collective action problem, the environment. Our ￿rst set of new results shows that,
overall, a focus on environmental policy is associated with greater SWD in statistically and
economically important ways in our sample of 16 European countries across a period of up to
25 years. Larger public expenditures on the environment tend to increase an average citizen’s
satisfaction score, while environmental taxes ceteris paribus reduce it. The ￿ndings for environ-
mental quality are more ambivalent. Broadly speaking, parents, young citizens and those with
high levels of educational attainment worry signi￿cantly more about appropriate environmen-
tal policy than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling. These
results are intuitive and should be of interest to scholars (including those studying collective
action problems other than those problems related to the environment) and policy-makers alike.
Although our paper thus makes progress on the important question of how the environment
matters for citizens’ SWD, it also has its limitations. Perhaps the primary drawback is that we
are not o￿ering a theoretical framework that neatly pins down exactly which variables should
play a role in SWD and which should not. This issue is partly addressed by our panel data setup
that allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. But even that approach
does not completely exclude the possibility that time-varying omitted variables are driving some
of our results. Further theoretical and conceptual work on SWD can, therefore, be fruitfully
conducted.
16If we rede￿ne the group of highly educated citizens to comprise those with 20 or more years of formal
education (instead of 16 or more years), the e￿ect of the summary measure increases to 0:131.
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19Data appendix
The information on the individual-level variables satisfaction with democracy, life satisfaction,
age, sex, family status, education, labor market status, and children is from the Mannheim Euro-
barometer Trend File, 1970-2002. This dataset is prepared by the Zentralarchiv fur Empirische
Sozialforschung (Hermann Schmitt and Evi Scholz) and, for instance, available as ICPSR Study
No. 4357. We start with all observations for which a measure of satisfaction with democracy
is available (see Table1). In our estimation analysis, however, we cannot exploit the full set of
observations, since information on some covariates is missing. Information on age enters into the
estimations based on binary variables for six age-groups (15 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54,
55 to 64, and over 65 years) where the youngest group serves as the base group. Family status
is captured by a binary variable equal to one if the respondent is married, and zero otherwise.
Educational attainment is incorporated based on binary variables capturing if a respondent is
still enrolled in school, has below 15 years of formal education (base group), between 16 and
19 years, or more than 20 years. With respect to labor market status we distinguish between
respondents who are employed (base group), self-employed, unemployed and out of the labor
force.
The information on the country-level covariates is from di￿erent sources. First, infor-
mation on real GDP per capita (in constant prices), the real GDP growth rate (percentage
change from previous year), the in￿ation rate (measured as the annual percentage increase in
the prices of consumption goods), openness (exports plus imports divided by real GDP per
capita; all measured in constant prices), and population size (in thousands) is from the Penn
World Tables (version 7:0). Further information is provided by http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ .
Second, the information on tax receipts (total tax receipts of government as a percentage of
GDP), the annual budget de￿cit (government primary balance) as a percentage of GDP, and
the index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system (following Rae 1968), green parties’
percentages of total cabinet posts (weighted by days) are from the Comparative Political Data
Set I, 1960-2008 provided by Klaus Armingeon, Sarah Engler, Panajotis Potolidis, MarlØne Ger-
ber and Philipp Leimgruber; see http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/
comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html .
Our measures of environmental policy are from two di￿erent sources. First, informa-
tion on the existence of a quota for electricity from renewable energy sources, an energy/CO 2
tax, a packaging rules, a sustainability council, a subsidy for electricity from renewable en-
ergy sources, energy e￿ciency labels, an environmental plan, ecolabels, an environmental o￿ce,
an environmental expert council, a general environmental act, environmental reporting rules,
a waste disposal act, environmental protection as a constitutional goal, a nature conservancy
act, and a soil protection act is collected from Binder (2002). We obtained the information by
reading them from the graphs. The graphs are fortunately of the quality that they allow the
unambiguous identi￿cation of all cases. Second, data on revenues from environmental taxes and
government expenditure on environment protection (both measured as percentages of GDP) are
from the database of Eurostat. (Data were retrieved on 2011/04/18.)
Our measures of environmental quality are from two primary sources. Firstly, information
on emissions of SOx, NOx, CO, VOC and CO2 from energy use is collected from the OECD
20Environmental Data, Compendium 2004. Secondly, the information on the road network (total
length of road networks, length of highways) and on the stock of road vehicles (total number of
passenger cars in use, total number of other motor vehicles in use) is obtained from the OECD
Environmental Data, Compendium 2006/2007.
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p
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c
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